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Abstract: The failure of the levee and ﬂoodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most
catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a ﬂow pathway below sea level,
so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, ﬂoodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half
days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall ﬂooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly
more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a
number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to
investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous
hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-ﬁlled gap on the inboard
side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure. The lessons learned from
this study are of importance for similar ﬂood protection systems throughout other regions of the United States and the world.

CE Database subject headings: Louisiana; Hurricanes; Floods; Failures; Levees; Drainage.

Introduction
This paper is the third of a series of companion papers that, to
gether, present the principal results of an investigation of the per
formance of the New Orleans regional ﬂood protection systems
during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck the New Orleans
region on August 29, 2005. This event has been the subject of
numerous studies including those from the Independent Levee
Investigation Team �ILIT� and the Interagency Performance
Evaluation Task Force �IPET�. More complete descriptions of
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these studies by the ILIT are available in ILIT �2006� and Seed
et al. �in preparation�. This paper addresses events that unfolded
near the north end of the 17th Street drainage canal during and
after the storm surge produced by the hurricane.
As shown in Fig. 1, the Orleans East Bank �downtown� basin
is one contiguously protected section. This protected unit contains
the Downtown District, French Quarter, Garden District, northern
Lakeview District, and Canal District. The northern edge of this
protected area is fronted by Lake Pontchartrain on the north, and
the Mississippi River passes along its southern edge. The Inner
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Fig. 1. �Color� Satellite view of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin, showing depths of maximum ﬂooding, and the locations of
full levee breaches and distressed levee sections �adapted from Van Heerden et al. 2006�

Harbor Navigation Channel �IHNC� passes along the east ﬂank of
this protected section, separating the Orleans East Bank protected
basin from New Orleans East �to the northeast� and from the
Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish �directly to the east�.
Three large drainage canals extend into the Orleans East Bank
protected basin from Lake Pontchartrain to the north, for the pur
pose of conveying water pumped northwards from the basin into
the lake by large pump stations within the city. These canals, from
west to east, are the 17th Street Canal, the Orleans Canal, and the
London Avenue Canal.
During the Katrina event, a majority of the ﬂow into the Or
leans East Bank basin came through the three large breaches that
occurred on the drainage canals at the northern end of the Orleans
East Bank protected area �ILIT 2006; Van Heerden et al. 2006;
IPET 2007�. As shown in Fig. 1, one catastrophic breach occurred
on the 17th Street drainage canal, and two catastrophic breaches
occurred on the London Avenue drainage canal. All three of these
failures scoured to depths well below mean sea level, and they
continued to admit ﬂow into the city from Lake Pontchartrain
well after the initial storm surge had subsided, eventually equili
brating with the still slightly swollen waters of Lake Pontchartrain
on the afternoon of September 1 at a water elevation of approxi

mately +3 ft above mean sea level �MSL�. The inﬂow from these
three large drainage canal breaches produced a majority of the
ﬂoodwaters that eventually ﬁlled more than 80% of the heavily
populated Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin �ILIT
2006; Van Heerden et al. 2006�.
This paper presents the results of forensic investigations and
analyses of the failure that occurred near the north end of the east
bank of the 17th Street drainage canal. An incipient failure oc
curred on the opposite side �i.e., west bank� of the canal, where
levee movements indicate that another failure was developing.
This second incident will be discussed along with other geo
graphically related events in the fourth companion paper of this
series �Seed et al. 2008b�. In this paper, the interplay between
local geology, history of design, and construction, and the storm
surge loading at the east bank breach site are investigated, and the
observed response of the levee system is explained. Several im
portant lessons are highlighted that will impact the repair and
upgrading of regional ﬂood protection systems in the New Or
leans area, as well as in other regions in the nation and the world
that also face levee-related risks.

Fig. 2. �Color� Breach at the East Bank of the 17th Street Drainage Canal �USACE 1990�

Failure and Breach on the East Bank
Fig. 2 shows an oblique aerial view of the large breach that oc
curred on the east bank of the 17th Street canal, with a military
helicopter lowering an oversized gravel-ﬁlled bag into the breach
as a part of the initial closure and emergency repairs. In the pho
tograph in Fig. 2, which was taken on September 2, 2005, it can
be noted that the ﬂoodwaters have equilibrated, and the surround
ing inboard-side neighborhood is fully ﬂooded. Also shown in the
middle of the photograph in Fig. 2 is the large, relatively intact
section of the original embankment that has slid laterally away
from the canal over a travel distance of approximately 49 ft �with
its crest fence still nearly vertical� and a small shed and a home
that have been damaged near the inboard-side toe of this laterally
displaced embankment section.
Fig. 3 shows a second oblique aerial view, this time looking
towards the southeast. The photograph in Fig. 3 has been anno
tated to show the approximately 49 ft of lateral translation of the
nearly intact central section of the earthen levee embankment
away from the canal. Fig. 3 also shows: �1� the still nearly level
crest of the laterally displaced embankment section and the nearly
vertical undamaged fence section, which indicates a lack of rota
tion of the overall displaced section; and �2� the top of the adja
cent concrete I-wall section, which appeared to have remained in
contact with the laterally displaced earthen embankment section
until lateral displacements had ceased, after which it partially
toppled back towards the canal as water pressures on both sides of
the breach section eventually equilibrated.
To aid in the description and understanding of the mechanisms
involved in this failure, generalized subsurface proﬁles through

the breach, both before and after the failure, are shown in Fig. 4
�ILIT 2006�. The displaced small shed and home shown near the
center of Fig. 2 are included in Fig. 4 for visual reference. The
cross sections of Fig. 4 are not schematic illustrations. Rather
they are based on three-dimensional light detection and ranging
�LIDAR� surveys, and visual mapping with measurements and

Fig. 3. Oblique aerial view of the 17th Street Canal breach on
September 1, 2005, showing the lateral offset of the relatively intact
central portion of the levee embankment, and the lack of rotation of
the horizontal crest surface and of the intact crest fence along this
displaced section �USACE 1990�
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Fig. 4. �Color� Cross section through the 17th Street canal breach showing conditions before and after failure

surveys of postfailure surface details and topography. Subsurface
details are based on interpretation of available boring logs, piezo
cone �CPTU� logs, recovered subsurface samples, and corollary
laboratory test data, including both pre-Katrina data from the
original design studies and post-Katrina data from both the IPET
and ILIT investigation teams. The three toe scarps shown in Fig.
4 were excavated to shallow depths, and their intersections with
the main shear surface were inferred based on measurements
made with hand transits.
Fig. 5 shows an excavated trench through the ﬁrst toe scarp at
the inboard side toe of the laterally displaced levee section �Toe
Scarp 1 from Fig. 4�b��. This feature had been jointly noted and
partially excavated manually by the combined ASCE and Na
tional Science Foundation �NSF�-sponsored ILIT ﬁeld investiga
tion teams on September 27 and 29, 2005, and was subsequently
further excavated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers �USACE�
as part of their initial IPET ﬁeld investigations �IPET 2007�. Fig.
6 shows the two additional toe scarps �Scarp Nos. 2 and 3 from
Fig. 4�b�� that occurred further inboard �farther to the landside�
from the scarp shown in Fig. 5. This breach was extensively in
vestigated by both the IPET and ILIT investigation teams, and
there are numerous additional borings and piezocone logs avail
able at adjacent sections to the north and south of this central
cross section of Fig. 4 �ILIT 2006; IPET 2007�. An illustration of
the sequence of evolution and progression of this failure �taken
along a transect slightly north of that shown in Fig. 4�, is pre
sented in a series of six successive stages or increments in the
companion paper by Rogers et al. �2008�.

As depicted in Fig. 4, the inboard side of the levee embank
ment has been pushed laterally by the elevated waters from the
canal side. During the storm, the water level within the canal rose
to approximately elevation +8 ft above MSL, as discussed later. It
is surmised that these elevated lateral water pressures eventually
opened a gap at the outboard side �waterside� of the sheetpiles
supporting the concrete ﬂoodwall, between the sheetpiles and the
levee embankment soils; effectively cutting the earthen embank
ment in half. Water entered into this gap, and further increased the

Fig. 5. View of the exit of the upper failure surface �Toe Scarp No.1�,
at the inboard toe of the laterally translated embankment �IPET 2006�
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Cross Section and Properties
The companion paper in this volume by Rogers et al. �2008�
presents a discussion of the regional and local geology relevant to
this breach location. Understanding of the local geology is of
paramount importance, and readers are directed there and to ILIT
�2006� and IPET �2007� for more comprehensive descriptions of
the geology at this site. The more concise site description that
follows leans heavily on this understanding of the overall geologi
cal context, and also on �1� the available pre-Katrina site data;
and �2� the extensive post-Katrina site investigations and labora
tory testing programs performed by both the ILIT and IPET in
vestigation teams �ILIT 2006; IPET 2006, 2007�.
As shown in Fig. 4, the top of the concrete ﬂoodwall was at
approximately elevation+ 12.4 ft above MSL, and the crest of the
earthen levee embankment section was at elevation+ 6 ft �MSL�.
The elevation of the land on the protected side of the levee toe
was at approximately elevation− 4.5 ft �MSL�. The levee embank
ment consisted of two separate sections. The upper, modern,
semicompacted embankment consisted mainly of brown clay and
silty clay of medium-to-high plasticity �CH and CL�. This was
underlain by older embankment sections, comprised largely of
locally available gray freshwater marsh and cypress swamp de
posits, herein referred to as marsh deposits, and lacustrine clays
�CH� placed without modern compaction over the preceding
century.
The levee embankment was underlain by marsh deposits vary
ing from a few feet to as much as 8 ft in thickness, and these were
underlain by a transition zone of interbedded marsh and
lacustrine/paludal �i.e., freshwater� clay deposits of similar thick
ness. These marsh deposits were organic-rich, peaty soils, vari
ably mixed with clayey mineral sediments. These, in turn, were
underlain by a layer of soft, gray high-plasticity lacustrine clay
�CH�. These soft gray clays were underlain by ﬁne sands. These
sands are sufﬁciently strong and competent relative to the weaker
overlying marsh and clay units that they were not involved in the
failure. Similarly, although these sands were relatively pervious,
this was not a signiﬁcant issue at this site as they occurred at
sufﬁcient depth that they were effectively capped with regard to
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Fig. 7. Summary of shear strength data within the 17th Street
drainage canal levee embankment ﬁll at and near the east bank breach
section

underseepage potential by the relatively thick and low permeabil
ity layer of soft gray clays.
Fig. 7 shows the shear strength data for the levee embankment
soils at the breach site. Both the upper �engineered ﬁll� and lower
�nonengineered ﬁll� embankment zones had signiﬁcantly higher
shear strengths and stiffnesses than the underlying foundation
soils, so the shear strengths of these embankment soils were not a
critical issue in this failure. The embankment section was split by
the I-wall and its supporting sheetpile curtain, and traveled largely
as a monolithic block during the failure. The heavy solid black
lines in Fig. 7 show the shear strengths modeled for the upper and
lower embankment ﬁll zones in the analyses.
The shear strengths of the foundation soils underlying the
levee embankment were critical issues. Accordingly, investigation
of the strengths and stiffnesses of �1� the upper marsh stratum; �2�
the intermediate transitional stratum; and �3� the lower soft, gray
paludal clay stratum are of great importance. Detailed character
ization of these soils, including full derivations of soil strengths
and stiffnesses, are provided by ILIT �2006�, and they are outside
the scope of this paper. Abbreviated descriptions are provided
below.
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Fig. 8. �a� Pore pressure ratio coefﬁcient Bq versus OCR and Bq versus depth within the soft gray clay �CH� foundation layer under the full height
embankment overburden load; �b� CPT cone factor Nkt based on Bq �adapted from Lunne et al. �1985� and Karlsrud et al. �1996�� for the soft gray
clay �CH� under full embankment overburden load

Soft Gray Clays
The principal sources of data regarding characterization of the
soft gray clay stratum were: �1� relatively “undisturbed” samples
obtained with thin-walled ﬁxed-piston samplers and then sub
jected to laboratory testing; �2� piezocone penetration test probes
�CPTU�; and �3� a limited number of in situ vane shear strength
tests.
High-quality 2.8-in.-diameter ﬁxed-piston samples of this soft
clay stratum were obtained by eliminating the inward “roll” of the
thin-walled sampling tubes, thus minimizing lateral expansion of
the samples as they entered into the sampling tube by reducing
the inside clearance ratio �ICR� 0�. This technique has been rec
ommended as one of the practical solutions for reducing sample
disturbance effects in these types of soft clays �e.g., Ladd and
DeGroot 2003; DeGroot et al. 2005�. Unconsolidated-undrained
triaxial tests �UUTX� tests were then performed on smaller diam
eter specimens hand carved from these samples. The initial �pre
Katrina� design ﬁeld investigations had used mainly UUTX tests

performed on specimens trimmed from 5-in.-diameter thin-walled
ﬁxed-piston samples, and the postfailure IPET investigation also
made signiﬁcant use of these same methods.
Because neither of the above techniques �relatively large di
ameter samples or improved sampler cutting edges� fully elimi
nates sampling disturbance effects, it was judged that the most
reliable strength interpretation for these soft soils was obtained by
careful processing of the in situ data from the CPTU probes. The
ILIT and IPET investigation teams developed CPT-based esti
mates of the undrained shear strengths of these lower clays based
on the standard equation su = �qc − �vo� / Nkt, where su�undrained
shear strength; qc �or qt��CPT tip resistance; �vo�initial total
vertical stress; and Nkt�cone tip coefﬁcient. Using the full suite
of piezocone data, including pore pressure measurements, and the
relationships of Lunne et al. �1985� as extended by Karlsrud
et al. �1996�, the material-speciﬁc CPT tip coefﬁcient was found
to be Nkt = 12, based on the pore pressure ratio coefﬁcient of
Bq = �u / �qc − �vo� = 0.48 – 0.68 �where �u�excess porewater pres
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Fig. 9. Plots of �a� OCR versus depth; �b� Su versus depth for the soft gray marsh clay �CH� at the inboard toe and further to the landside �not
under levee embankment overburden pressure�—17th Street Canal breach site

sure� for the normally consolidated portion of this soft clay unit,
as shown in Fig. 8 �see ILIT 2006 for more details�. The selected
tip coefﬁcient of Nkt = 12 differed from the non-site-speciﬁc value
of Nkt = 15 assumed by others �e.g., IPET 2007�, and resulted in a
slightly different interpretation of strengths for this lower, soft
gray clay stratum. For example, the IPET strengths were about
15–20% lower than the ILIT strengths within the normally con
solidated portions of the proﬁle, and were lower by even larger
amounts in those parts of the proﬁle that our �ILIT� investigation
judged to be overconsolidated.
Based on a characterization procedure suggested by Pestana
�ILIT 2006�, the shear strengths estimated based on the materialspeciﬁc CPTU tip coefﬁcient �Nkt� could be interpreted through
an inverse stress history and normalized soil engineering param
eters �SHANSEP�-type regression to simultaneously evaluate: �1�
the apparent overconsolidation proﬁle versus depth; and �2� the
corresponding values of undrained shear strength versus effective
overburden stress �su / ��vo� as a function of the overconsolidation
ratio �OCR�, for both normally consolidated and overconsolidated
portions of the soil stratum. Fig. 9 shows the resulting proﬁles of
OCR and normalized shear strength su / ��vo versus depth for the
soft gray foundation clay and also for the upper marsh strata at a
location directly below the inboard �landside� toe of the levee
embankment. In Fig. 9, the lower two overconsolidated zones are
within the lower soft clay stratum, and the upper overconsolidated
zone is within the intermixed clays and marsh deposits. As shown
in Fig. 9, the foundation soils are interpreted to not be normally
consolidated; instead, they exhibit at least three distinct overcon
solidation crusts likely due to periodic exposure and desiccation

during at least three separate periods during the progressive ac
cretion of these deposits during the Holocene. In addition, the
base of the deeper clay stratum appears to be slightly overcon
solidated, which may be attributed to the rapid initial consolida
tion near to the pervious drainage layer as well as secondary
compression effects �Rogers et al. 2008�. In contrast, the IPET
investigation considered this layer to be normally consolidated
over its full depth �IPET 2006, 2007�.
The three overconsolidated crusts were found to be less pro
nounced beneath the central portion of the levee embankment, as
the higher overburden stresses introduced by the construction of
the overlying levee embankment, reduced the OCR in that region
to those of nearly normally consolidated soil conditions. How
ever, the strengths of the soils under the center of the embank
ment are signiﬁcantly less important than those of the soils be
neath and adjacent to the inboard-side toe of the levee for
evaluating the potential for lateral or rotational embankment in
stabilities. The available data clearly suggest three distinct and
signiﬁcant desiccation-type overconsolidation crusts existed in
the foundation soils beneath the inboard toe of the 17th Street
drainage canal levee at this site.
The overall regression of the CPTU data resulted in a best-ﬁt
value of �su / ���NC,TX = 0.31 for the normally consolidated soft
gray paludal clay zones, and a SHANSEP coefﬁcient of m = 0.75
deﬁning the relationship between su / ��v and OCR �i.e., su / ��v
= �su / ��v�NC � OCRm� �Ladd and Foott 1974�. These are fairly
typical values for clays of this plasticity, and they are in excellent
agreement with the values determined by Foott and Ladd �1977�
for the well-studied clays at the nearby Atchafalaya River basin
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the levee; �b� at and near the inboard toe of the levee, including the ILIT, IPET, and pre-Katrina data

and with the values of clays of similar plasticity from a larger
database �e.g., Ladd and DeGroot 2003�. The Atchafalaya clays
have similar mineralogy and derive their source materials from
the same Mississippi River drainage system.
The solid lines in Fig. 10 show the resulting proﬁles of und
rained shear strength within the soft gray clay foundation stratum
�a� beneath the crest of the levee, and �b� beneath the inboard side
levee toe, based on �su / ��v�NC = 0.31 and m = 0.75 for triaxial com
pression conditions. The two overconsolidated horizons within
these clays are apparent in Fig. 10. The results of UUTX tests on
“relatively undisturbed” ILIT samples, laboratory vane shear tests
�LVST� on ILIT samples, and in situ ﬁeld vane shear strength
tests �FVST� are shown in Fig. 10 for completeness. Agreement
between the interpretation derived based on the inverse regression
of the CPTU data with the other data is good, and the overall ﬁt of
the modeled strength proﬁles to all of the data is reasonable.
The shear strength proﬁles of Fig. 10 were next modiﬁed fur
ther to account for the direct simple shear �DSS� mechanism that
would dominate the primary deformation response in the ﬁeld for
the types of stability failure mechanisms under consideration. The
strengths shown in Fig. 10 are appropriate for triaxial compres
sion stress paths �su,TX�, and so they need to be modiﬁed to
produce values appropriate for analyses of stress paths better rep
resented by DSS conditions �su,DSS�. A reduction of undrained
shear strength, by multiplication by a factor of 0.82, was applied
as su,DSS = 0.82 � su,TX. The factor of 0.82 accounts jointly for both

stress path and material strength anisotropy according to the work
of Ladd and DeGroot �2003� and observed by other researchers
�e.g., Pestana et al. 2002�, as shown in Fig. 11. This adjustment is
similar to the DSS strength reduction factor previously found to
be applicable to the mineralogically similar Atchafalaya River
basin shallow lacustrine clays �Foott and Ladd 1977�.
For conventional limit equilibrium analyses, the resulting
strengths were then reduced by an additional 10% to account for
sensitivity �the ratio of peak undrained shear strength versus re
sidual strength� and resultant progressive rupture, based on the
work of Chirapuntu and Duncan �1975�. In summary, the und
rained shear strengths of this gray clay were thus modeled based
on OCR values that varied spatially across the domain,
�su / ��v�NC,DSS = 0.23, for the normally consolidated zones, and a
SHANSEP coefﬁcient of m = 0.75 deﬁning the relationship be
tween su / ��v and OCR for other regions in the domain.
Finite-element analyses were performed using the commer
cially available code PLAXIS �Brinkgreve 2007�. In these analy
ses, the soft soil model, an isotropic effective stress constitutive
model, was used to simulate the foundation clay stratum. One
signiﬁcant shortcoming of this model is the inability to simulta
neously match the friction angle in drained tests and the und
rained shear strength in undrained tests, unlike other more
sophisticated clay models �e.g., Pestana et al. 2002�. Despite this
and other shortcomings, the model captures the effects of stress
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Table 1. Summary of Soil Model Parameters Used in PLAXIS Analyses

history and it is possible to calibrate the model parameters to
match the undrained strength proﬁle as well as the compression
characteristics �with two different sets of properties�.
The numerical analyses presented here assumed essentially
undrained shearing conditions during the rapidly rising hurricane
storm surge loading. Development of parameters for the soft soil
model was an iterative process, and concentrated on achieving the
targeted undrained shear strength �as a function of effective ver
tical stress and overconsolidation ratio at each point� for DSS
modes in single element tests, as described previously. The effec
tive friction angle ���� and the additional model parameters
deﬁning compressibility properties �� , �, related to Cc and Cr�
were calibrated so that the overall model response corresponded
to undrained shear strengths �in DSS mode� representing
�su / ��v�NC,DSS = 0.23 for the normally consolidated clay, and a
SHANSEP coefﬁcient of m = 0.75. Numerical simulations using
an updated Lagrangian approximation to simulate the large settle
ments resulting from the placement of the embankment were used
to calibrate the compressibility parameters and obtain the ap
proximate current �pre-Katrina� conﬁguration. Similar calibration
exercises have been conducted successfully to match observed
pore pressure response, lateral deformations, and settlements of
other levees during construction �e.g., URS/ARUP 2005�. A suite
of single elements were modeled at various lateral and vertical
locations within the soft gray foundation clays to conﬁrm the
achievement of this targeted response. The effective friction angle
of �� = 36° shown in Table 1 does not represent a drained friction
angle, but it is instead chosen to match the undrained strength as
described previously, given the intrinsic limitations of the soft soil
model. Analogous modeling for triaxial space conditions was also
performed and results from such “element-level” tests, at loca
tions directly beneath the inboard toe of the embankment, are
shown by the large black triangles in Fig. 9; the match is excel
lent. No parameters were developed to model the “drained” response after the failure event. A more complete description of the
calibration process is found in ILIT �2006�.

kv
�ft/day�

�

�*

Fig. 11. Undrained shear strength for UU-triaxial loading versus
undrained shear strength for DSS loading �adapted from Ladd and
DeGroot 2003�

Upper compacted levee ﬁll �CL�
Mohr–Coulomb Undrained
N/A
115
0.0028 0.00028 0.35 —
—
—
—
—
234,000
900
0.001
—
—
Mohr–Coulomb Undraineda
Lower uncompacted levee ﬁll �CH�
N/A
95
0.00028 0.000028 0.35 —
—
—
—
—
180,000
600
0.001
—
—
Mohr–Coulomb Undraineda
Thin hurricane stratum �CL/OL�
N/A
85
0.00028 0.000028 0.4
—
—
—
—
—
variesb
variesc 0.001
—
—
Marsh
Soft soil
Undraineda
N/A
80
0.3
0.03
— 0.21 0.033 0.15 0.6 1.9
—
0
—
36
variesd
Intermixing zone
Soft soil
Undraineda
N/A
85
0.3
0.03
—
0.1 0.02 0.15 0.61 1.27
—
0
—
23
variesd
a
Lower gray Paludal clay �CH�
Soft soil
Undrained
N/A
95
0.00028 0.000028 — 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.63 1.24
—
0
—
22
variesd
Sand stratum �SC� beneath the gray clay Mohr–Coulomb
Drained
N/A
110
0.28
0.28
0.3
—
—
—
—
— 1,000,000
0.01
38
—
—
Note: N/A�not available.
a
These soils were modeled as “drained” during consolidation under the embankment ﬁll loads, but were then modeled as “undrained” during the short-duration loading represented by the rapid storm surge
rise within the canal.
b
Stiffnesses also varied with overburden stress. Maximum values of Eref = 90,000 lb/ ft2 occurred beneath the levee crest, and minimum values of Eref = 30,000 lb/ ft2 occurred inboard of the levee toe.
c
Undrained shear strengths of this thin stratum varied laterally across the mesh, as a function of effective overburden stress, as described in the text. Maximum values occurred beneath the center of the
embankment �250 lb/ ft2�, and minimum values occurred in the free ﬁeld inboard of the levee toe �70 lb/ ft2�.
d
OCR varies laterally across the domain as a function of overburden stress, and also varies over depth within these deposits as illustrated previously in Fig. 9.
e
Friction angle for soft soil model deﬁned at Pref�1 atm.
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Fig. 12. Undrained shear strength versus depth, and OCR versus depth, within the marsh deposits beneath the inboard toe based on Mayne and
Mitchell �1988�—17th Street Canal breach site

Upper Marsh Deposits and Transitional Zone
The upper marsh deposits, and the upper transitional deposits rep
resenting variably mixed marsh and clay strata, were somewhat
more difﬁcult to characterize. Similar application of the CPTUbased relationships of Lunne et al. �1985� and Karlsrud et al.
�1996� resulted in establishment of a material-speciﬁc CPT tip
coefﬁcient Nkt � 16 for these units. This was close to the non
material-speciﬁc value of Nkt � 15 used by the IPET investigation
for these marsh and clay foundation strata �IPET 2007�. Fig. 9
shows the interpretation of shear strengths within these upper
marsh and transitional strata based only on the CPTU data �using
Nkt � 15 for the marsh and Nkt = 12 for the underlying clay de
posit�. Our �ILIT� values of shear strength in these potentially
important upper marsh and transitional clay strata were next cross
checked using an empirical relationship between undrained shear
strengths and water content �wo, %� and plasticity index �PI, %�
developed by Mayne and Mitchell �1988� for these types of soils.
Fig. 12 shows this second interpretation; a comparison between
the various other types of shear strength data available within the
upper marsh stratum �UUTX, consolidated-undrained triaxial text
�CUTX�, and FVST� based on the relationship proposed by
Mayne and Mitchell �1988�. There was good agreement between
these two methods of strength interpretation for these marsh and
transitional strata.
Fig. 13 then shows the interpreted resulting overall shear
strengths as modeled within the marsh and upper transition zone
at two locations: �a� beneath the crest of the levee; and �b� at the
inboard-side levee toe. The heavy, solid lines indicate the repre
sentative undrained shear strengths as modeled in the numerical
analyses. The shear strengths within these marsh deposits were, in
general, slightly higher than the undrained shear strengths of the

underlying soft, gray clays. A single, localized exception was the
“sensitive zone” that occurred near to the base of the marsh de
posits, as shown in Fig. 13, and this will be discussed in the
section that follows. Compatible soil parameters were then devel
oped for the soft soil model to capture the targeted undrained
shear strength values for these upper marsh and transition strata
�ILIT 2006�, as was described for the underlying soft gray clays
in the preceding section.
Critical Soil Stratum
The zone indicated in Fig. 13 as the sensitive zone was a semicontinuous stratigraphic horizon in the vicinity of the breach area,
which contained a thin layer of sensitive organic clay. As noted
previously in Fig. 4, this layer was only approximately
0.8– 1.2 in. �2 – 3 cm� in thickness, and was found to extend fully
across the breach area, along the east side of the canal. The depth
at which this thin stratum occurred varied slightly across the site,
so the zone within which this critical stratum occurred appears to
be thicker in Fig. 13 than the actual stratum thickness of approxi
mately 1 in. It was easily missed in many of the borings advanced
by the ILIT team, requiring three rounds of sampling for each
successful sample, due to its high water content and sensitivity
�Rogers et al. 2008�.
Fig. 14�a� shows a photograph of the sensitive layer, believed
to have served as the basal rupture surface beneath the translated
blocks shown previously in Fig. 3 and depicted in Fig. 4. The
sample shown in Fig. 14�a� was obtained from within the shear
failure zone, and has been remoulded to a residual condition. The
layer exhibited physical evidence of having been unidirectionally
sheared and remolded in situ, and in the direction of the observed
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Fig. 13. Shear strength versus depth within the marsh deposits at the 17th Street Canal breach site: �a� beneath the crest of the levee; �b� at the
inboard toe

translational failure, as demonstrated by the unidirectional pulling
and tearing of organic ﬁbers �up to 5 cm thick�, and it exhibited
an unusually low �nearly zero� residual strength �ILIT 2006�. This
is the stratum along which the main translational shear failure is
hypothesized to have occurred at this site. Fig. 14�b� shows an
other sample of the sensitive layer; this time recovered from an
area well outside of the August 2005 failure zone, and so repre
senting a more nearly undisturbed specimen. These relatively un
disturbed samples exhibited distinctive contrasts from those in the
failure zone insofar that they appeared much less disturbed and
without snapped branches, dragged organics, or water-ﬁlled large
voids. The sensitive layer also contained discernible sequences of
organic, peaty materials, and soft clays. The nearby soft clays do
not exhibit a glossy character, and at in situ water contents they
appear ﬂat and dull. The layer of sensitive organic silty clay is
starkly different. As shown in Fig. 14�b�, this material is highly
glossy, and is also somewhat translucent. This material is softer
than the nearby soft clays and marsh deposits, and it is exhibited
greater sensitivity during shear testing.
It was difﬁcult to locate this thin layer initially with conven
tional site investigation methods. This layer had been deposited as
a result of a previous hurricane, approximately 600–700 years ago
based on carbon dating of pollens from a sample of this material
�ILIT 2006�. That hurricane had temporarily changed the local
depositional regime, churned up organics and silts, and mixed
them with the locally available suspended clays, and laid down a
thin layer that was ﬂocculated due to the increased salinity caused
by the storm. The brackish seawater served as an effective ﬂoc
culant, triggering a faster deposition of the suspended ﬁnes, fol
lowed by dead organics, killed by the brackish water intrusion.
The hurricane winds, and the salt, also produced wind-blown or-

ganic detritus and a vegetation die off, so that a layer of leaves
and occasional twigs varying from about 4 to 10 in. in thickness
was then deposited immediately above this very weak, sensitive
thin clay layer. When drilling down, these leaves and twigs ob
struct sampling. When the hole is suitably cleaned out for sam
pling; the very thin layer may also have been removed. Similarly,
when pushing a CPT through the obstructing overlying organic
detritus, by the time the tip and sleeve readings begin to clear this
layer of detritus material to sense the thin layer, the thin stratum
has often been largely passed through. Fig. 14�c� shows the shiny
material of this thin stratum coating the outside of the soils ad
hered to the base of the auger ﬂight. When these soils are then
peeled open �the inset in Fig. 14�c��, the organic �ﬁbrous and
twiggy� character of the obscuring overlying organic detritus is
revealed.
During the original �pre-Katrina� site investigations for initial
design, multiple adjacent borings at the site failed to retrieve
samples at this same depth �ILIT 2006; Rogers et al. 2008�. This
failure to retrieve samples at the same depth in adjacent boreholes
might have served as an indication that something unusual was
present. The post-Katrina borings performed as part of the IPET
investigation also failed to retrieve samples of the critical thin
sensitive clay stratum, but this thin layer can in hindsight be seen
in a number of the post-Katrina electronic CPTU logs performed
as part of that investigation �IPET 2007�.
The ILIT effort initially experienced similar difﬁculties in its
attempt to retrieve samples of this thin stratum. The overlying
ﬁbrous material made it difﬁcult to access, and the material itself
was so weak and sensitive that it would not sustain the tension
necessary to retain samples within the sampling tubes. A modiﬁed
approach was developed which involved drilling down until the

A

B

Fig. 14. � Color� �a� Sheared sample of the sensitive organic silty clay layer from within the slide area; �b� unsheared sample of the same material
from near to the slide area, but not within it; and �c� shiny dark brown to black sensitive organic clay on auger stem and �inset� closeup view of
layers of leaves and twigs—17th Street Canal breach site

closely overlying organic detritus layer was encountered and then
drilling slowly through this layer to identify its base. Then, a
second hole was drilled adjacent to the previous hole until the
depth of the base of the organic detritus had nearly been reached
�usually within approximately 4 in. of the top of the targeted thin
underlying organic silty clay stratum�. A thin-walled �very sharp
edged� sampling tube was then pushed well below the base of the
thin stratum �oversampling past the thin stratum by at least 2 ft�,
so that the ﬁrmer soils underlying this stratum would plug the
base of the sampler allowing the soft horizon to be successfully
retrieved.
Once samples of this material had been obtained, the next
problem was to ascertain its shear strength characteristics. That
was accomplished in the laboratory by using a pipe cutter to trim
the tubes down slowly in 2-in. increments, using stiffeners to
maintain the circularity of the tube during cutting �to avoid dis
turbance�, and then carefully excavating the material within the
tube by hand. When the organic detritus had been cleared, and the
thin, sensitive layer of organic clayey silt was uncovered within
the tube, a small-scale laboratory vane shear test �LVST� was then
performed at constant rate within this thin stratum. Although use

ful in deﬁning the depth of this stratum across the site, in situ
piezocone penetration test data �CPTU� were not useful in further
quantitatively deﬁning the shear strength characteristics of this
stratum due to its being typically only approximately one inch �or
so� in thickness.
As indicated previously, the peak undrained shear strengths of
this thin, sensitive layer are lower than those of the other paludal
clay horizons in the old freshwater marsh and cypress swamp
deposits. Values of peak undrained shear strength within this ma
terial were found to vary from su � 200 to 300 lb/ ft2 beneath the
full overburden loading under the centerline of the levee embank
ment to su � 75 to 125 lb/ ft2 beneath the inboard side levee toe.
Fig. 15 shows results from a suite of four of the laboratory vane
shear tests performed on the thin “hurricane” stratum, expressed
in normalized fashion as shear stress divided by the peak und
rained shear strength of each sample �� / su�. Also shown in this
ﬁgure is a suite of four additional LVST performed on relatively
undisturbed samples of the nearby soft gray clays �CH� from
slightly lower in the soil proﬁle at this site. As shown in Fig. 15,
this thin stratum is more sensitive than the nearby clays; it drops
more rapidly to a lower fraction of its peak strength at low levels
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tests on both the soft, gray foundation clays �CH� and the thin stratum of sensitive organic clayey silt

of shear displacement. Because this layer is also very thin, and
thus prone to essentially full transition to low residual strength at
small overall lateral offsets, it represents a very weak and brittle
element relative to the overlying and underlying soft soils at this
site with regard to potential lateral translational instability. Re
sidual strengths of the material in this thin stratum were found to
be very low, typically on the order of su � 10– 40 lb / ft2.
Because of the weak and sensitive nature of this thin stratum,
the peak shear strengths measured by this laboratory vane shear
testing program were reduced by 15% to produce the engineering
peak shear strengths used in the analyses �to accommodate the
effects of strain softening and progressive rupture�. Additional
reductions were not made for the combined effects of anisotropy
and stress path, as this was a structured, ﬂocculated clay deposit
at light to moderate overburden. These additional factors �aniso
tropy and stress path� were judged to be moderate, and because
no sample is perfectly undisturbed, these additional factors would
be offset somewhat by reductions in the strengths measured in the
laboratory due to disturbance effects.
For the ﬁnite-element analyses, the Mohr–Coulomb model
was used, which does not allow explicit modeling of strain soft
ening. The reduction of shear strengths described above was
judged necessary for both limit equilibrium analyses and ﬁniteelement analyses as an approximate treatment of this sensitivity.
Subsequent to the ILIT’s initial studies �ILIT 2006�, additional
analyses have now been performed in which the actual �full� peak
shear strength and the actual transition from peak to residual
strength were modeled explicitly through stepwise changes in the
properties as a function of deformation experienced at various
locations along the potential failure surface �special treatment of
this strain softening, through the reduction of strength in steps�,
and the results are reported in Seed et al. �in preparation�. Com
parison between the analyses reported herein �which approximate
this effect� and those subsequent analyses that more explicitly

model strain softening suggest that using a slightly more severe
strain softening/progressive rupture penalty factor of approxi
mately 0.75–0.8 to approximate the effects of this strain softening
would have provided slightly better agreement with the more ad
vanced subsequent analyses. Both sets of analyses appear to agree
well with the actual observed ﬁeld performance of the levee at the
17th Street Canal breach.

Limit Equilibrium and Finite-Element Analyses
Both conventional limit equilibrium analyses using Spencer’s
method �Spencer 1967�, cross checked against several others, and
ﬁnite-element analyses, through the strength reduction procedure
�Brinkgreve 2007�, were performed to evaluate overall stability
and displacements as water levels rose within the canal. The re
sults of both types of analyses were in close agreement.
As discussed previously, the soft soil model within PLAXIS
was selected to model the soft foundation clays, the transition
zone, and the marsh strata. The thin, sensitive critical stratum was
modeled with a simpler, nonlinear Mohr–Coulomb model, and
undrained shear strengths �modeled as cohesion: “c”� were di
rectly input into each element to model the variation of strength
as a function of overburden pressure shown in the laboratory vane
shear testing. Properties used to model all of these foundation
soils thus varied laterally across the ﬁnite-element mesh �due to
changes in vertical effective stress�, and with the exception of the
thin critical stratum, they also varied vertically due to the verti
cally varying OCR proﬁles as described previously. Detailed de
scriptions of the parametric modeling are presented in ILIT
�2006�, and Table 1 presents a summary of parameters modeled in
the PLAXIS analyses.
The limit equilibrium method �LEM� analyses for this study

Table 2. Summary of Soil Shear Strength Parameters Used for Limit Equilibrium Analyses
Stratum name

Soil model

Shearing
type

�sat
�lb/ ft2�

c
�lb/ ft2�

��

�su / p��NC

�

Upper levee embankment ﬁll
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
115
900
0
—
—
Lower levee embankment ﬁll
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
95
600
0
—
—
Upper marsh, beneath crest
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
80
375
0
—
—
Upper marsh, free ﬁeld
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
80
200
0
—
—
Thin sensitive layer; beneath crest
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
85
240
0
—
—
Thin sensitive layer; beneath toe
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
85
180
0
—
—
Thin sensitive layer; free ﬁeld
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
85
70
0
—
—
Soft gray clay �CH�
Mohr–Coulomb
Undrained
95
Variesa
—
0.23
0.75
Sand �SC�
Mohr–Coulomb
Drained
110
0
33°
—
—
a
Values of cohesive shear strength were directly input at different locations so as to capture the variations implicit in the distribution of OCR over the
domain, and the SHANSEP parameters shown in the two right-hand columns.

were performed mainly using the program SLOPE/W of the soft
ware package GEOSTUDIO �Krahn 2004�. Shear strengths mod
eled in limit equilibrium analyses also varied both laterally and
vertically across the problem domain, and were essentially iden
tical to the shear strengths effectively modeled in the ﬁniteelement analyses. Table 2 presents a summary of shear strengths
modeled in the limit equilibrium analyses.
Full details of the ﬁnite-element analyses are reported in ILIT
�2006�. Fig. 16 shows relative shear strain levels �shear strain,
divided by shear strain to failure, within each of the soils� calcu
lated by these analyses at a canal water level of elevation
+ 8.5 ft �MSL�, which is approximately the water level at which
failure appears to have occurred. Fig. 16 shows localization of the
shear deformations along a translational sliding surface con
strained by the location of the thin, sensitive stratum within the
upper marsh deposits.

Interface elements were employed between the sheetpiles and
the soils on their outboard sides, and when tension was calculated
at these interfaces, the analysis was halted and the mesh was
manually altered to allow the sheetpile to separate from the soils
in the zone where tension had been calculated. Lateral water pres
sures were applied to both sides of the newly opened gap. This
was iteratively repeated at each canal water level until gap propa
gation ceased, and then the next incremental rise in canal water
levels was introduced and the analysis proceeded. The ﬁniteelement analyses showed that as the canal water level rose to
approximately elevation+ 6.5 to +7.5 ft �MSL�, a tensile gap
began to open on the outboard side of the sheetpile curtain, be
tween the sheetpiles and the outboard side half of the earthen
levee embankment. Water entered into this gap, and applied ad
ditional water pressures against the sheetpile curtain. This, in turn,
caused the gap to open rapidly to greater depth with subsequent
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water level rises, allowing the lateral water forces eventually to be
applied to essentially the full depth of the sheetpile curtain.
The development of a water-ﬁlled gap on the canal side of the
sheetpile had a signiﬁcantly deleterious effect on overall levee
stability. A water-ﬁlled gap had been observed in the ﬁeld at ad
ditional failure sites on the London Avenue Canal during the ini
tial post-Katrina forensic visits �Seed et al. 2008b�, and was also
strongly suggested by the postfailure geometry and conditions at
the 17th Street canal breach. Water-ﬁlled gapping was, therefore,
also modeled in the conventional limit equilibrium method analy
ses; modeling a water-ﬁlled gap to full depth at the outboard side
of the sheetpile curtain. Additional limit equilibrium analyses
were also performed without this water-ﬁlled gap, and the results
of those analyses showed signiﬁcantly higher overall factors of
safety �on the order of 15–20% higher� for the latter stages of
storm surge rise within the canal than analyses that included the
water-ﬁlled gap. The best estimate calculations of factor of safety
by means of the conventional limit equilibrium analyses were
those that assumed the formation of a water-ﬁlled gap fully to the
base of the sheetpiles during the latter stages of storm surge rise.
Fig. 17 shows the evolution of factor of safety as water levels
rose, based on ﬁnite-element analyses. The two sets of symbols
on the right �open squares and open diamonds� represent the re
sults of ﬁnite-element analyses of two different potential failure
mechanisms, both without allowing the formation of a waterﬁlled gap on the canal side of the sheetpile wall. The “marsh
drained” analyses in Fig. 17 represent the consideration of underseepage pressures and potential failure of the marsh stratum di
rectly beneath the thin critical stratum. The marsh undrained
analyses represent the potential failure along the thin critical “hur
ricane” stratum itself. The solid squares to the left are also based
on ﬁnite-element analyses. The solid squares present results spe
ciﬁcally for potential translational failure along the thin critical
stratum, and they show the factor of safety if a water-ﬁlled gap
extends fully to the base of the sheetpile wall throughout the
storm surge. Finally, the solid line with an arrow in Fig. 17 is
based on sequential �incremental� ﬁnite-element analyses model
ing the incremental water rise and the corresponding incremental
�progressive� gap formation, and thus, shows the actual calculated
evolution of conditions as the water-ﬁlled gap initially begins to
open at a canal water elevation of approximately +7 ft �MSL� and
then opens to progressively greater depths as the canal water level
continues to rise. The ﬁnite-element analyses showed that this gap
should begin to open at a canal water level of approximately
elevation + 7 ft �MSL�, and that it would develop essentially fully

to the base of the sheetpiles very soon thereafter.
Conventional limit equilibrium analyses could not be used to
track this progressive evolution of a water-ﬁlled gap, but the
results of limit equilibrium analyses for both the “gapped” and
“ungapped” cases agreed closely with the ﬁnite-element results
presented in Fig. 17, so that conventional limit equilibrium analy
ses conservatively assuming that a water-ﬁlled gap would even
tually develop also served to explain well the observed failure at
a water elevation of approximately +7.5 to +8.5 ft, �MSL� �ILIT
2006�.
There is relatively good agreement that the failure occurred at
a canal water elevation of between about +7.5 to +8.5 ft �MSL�
�e.g., ILIT 2006; Van Heerden et al. 2006; IPET 2007�. Water
marks at locations along the Lake Pontchartrain shoreline in the
vicinity of the head of the 17th Street canal that were not affected
by waves indicate that the water level along the south shore of
Lake Pontchartrain reached a maximum surge elevation of +9 to
+9.5 ft �MSL� at the mouth of the 17th Street canal, just to the
north of the failure site �Van Heerden et al. 2006; IPET 2007�.
There was a signiﬁcant amount of wooden debris generated by
storm waves and their destruction of docks and other exposed
facilities along the south shore of the lake, however, and this
debris was drawn into the narrow openings beneath the Hammond
Highway Bridge across the north end of the 17th Street canal as
storm surge waters passed into the canal. Therefore, it is not clear
exactly what fraction of the full storm rise of +9 to +9.5 ft �MSL�
from the adjacent lake was fully transmitted through this potential
obstruction/constriction and into the canal.
Actual storm surge levels were measured and manually re
corded at 30 min intervals during the storm at the extreme south
end of the canal, at the large pumping station, and these showed
that water levels at the south end of the canal rose to elevation
+ 7.5 ft �MSL� by about 5:00 a.m., but that between 6:00 and 6:30
a.m. they temporarily stopped rising and even brieﬂy dipped a bit
to as low as +6.5 ft �MSL�. They then resumed their rise, re
achieving an elevation of nearly +7 ft �MSL� but exhibiting a
series of intermittent ﬂuctuations and small drops. At some point
shortly after 9:00 a.m., they dropped rapidly back to less than
+2 ft �MSL� and never rose again to levels much higher than that.
It is not clear whether the half-hourly recordings fully captured
the peak water level. Based on eyewitness testimony, and a vid
eotape shot by a ﬁre crew from the adjacent Jefferson Parish �that
did not record the actual major breach occurring, but captured its
immediate aftermath�, it is inferred that the I-wall moved laterally
and opened a V-shaped notch between two of the concrete I-wall
panels �as reported by an eyewitness� at about 6:00 a.m. That
would likely correspond to the ﬁrst minor �and temporary� dip in
surge rise observed at the south end of the canal. The main breach
subsequently occurred at about 9:00 a.m., producing the rapid and
permanent lowering of storm surge water levels within the canal.
Given the length of the canal �approximately 2 miles�, water lev
els at the north end of the canal may have differed slightly from
those observed at the pumping station at the south end.
These hand recorded stage observations, coupled with the eye
witness testimony �IPET 2007�, would appear to suggest that suf
ﬁcient wall displacement had occurred at about 6:00 a.m. as to
produce separation between two adjacent concrete I-wall panels
�at a canal water elevation of approximately +7.5 ft �MSL� at the
eventual breach site�, and that the main breach and lateral trans
lational stability failure occurred at about 9:00 a.m. at a canal
water elevation of approximately +7.5 to +8 ft �MSL� at the
breach site. Thus, the analyses performed �both limit equilibrium,
and ﬁnite-element analyses� showing that failure would have been

expected to occur at a canal water elevation of approximately
+7.5 to +8.5 ft �MSL� are in good agreement with observed ﬁeld
behavior �ILIT 2006�. Similarly, the displacements calculated by
the ﬁnite-element analyses showing that signiﬁcant gapping and
signiﬁcant lateral wall displacements would begin to occur at
canal water elevations of approximately +7 ft �MSL� also appear
to be in good agreement with the apparent ﬁeld performance �in
cluding the occurrence of sufﬁcient displacements as to produce a
separation between two adjacent concrete I-wall panels at a canal
water surge elevation of approximately elevation+ 7.5 ft �MSL��.
As an aside, the limit equilibrium analyses for this study were
performed mainly using the program SLOPE/W. This code has a
programming error that results in an incorrect numerical treat
ment of conditions associated with a water-ﬁlled crack at the heel
of a failure mass for undrained analysis conditions; a problem that
became apparent when the initial results of limit equilibrium
analyses were compared with the results of ﬁnite element analy
ses and hand calculations. Similar problems were found in some
other slope stability programs such as UTEXAS4 �Wright 1999�.
This problem has now been ﬁxed in UTEXAS4 �Wright, personal
communication�, and it is expected that it will be rectiﬁed in other
codes. In the interim, the solution to this problem is to delete the
soil mass to the far side of the crack �on the canal side of the
“water-ﬁlled gap” at the outboard side of the sheetpile curtains for
these levee section analyses�, and to manually apply the lateral
water forces acting against the resulting exposed vertical face.

Examination of an Alternate Hypothesis
for the Failure
Fig. 16 clearly shows the localization of shear strains �and shear
failure� along the thin stratum of weak, sensitive organic silty clay
silt at shallow depth beneath the levee embankment, just at the
start of incipient �large translational� full lateral instability. Fig.
16 also shows a second potential competing failure mechanism
that is partially developed at this same canal water elevation
�elevation+ 8.5 ft �MSL��. This second mechanism, highlighted
by a dashed white line superimposed in Fig. 16, is a deeper semirotational failure through the underlying soft gray foundation
clays. This deeper, rotational mechanism has been identiﬁed as
the critical mechanism by the IPET investigation �IPET 2006,
2007�, and the second most critical mechanism by our ILIT in
vestigation �ILIT 2006�.
Fig. 18 shows the most critical failure surfaces for these two
competing potential modes of failure, as well as the resulting
geometries arising from each failure mechanism, using our inter
pretations of foundation soil strengths and a conservatively esti
mated maximum canal water elevation of +8.5 ft �MSL�. Fig.
18�a� shows the shallow critical failure surface along the thin,
sensitive hurricane stratum and the corresponding factor of safety
for a canal water elevation of +8.5 ft �MSL� as calculated by limit
equilibrium analyses �Spencer’s method�, while Fig. 18�b� shows
the lateral translational failure mechanism observed in the ﬁeld.
Similarly, Fig. 18�c� shows the deeper critical rotational failure
mode, and Fig. 18�d� shows the likely resulting movements in the
ﬁeld compatible with this more rotational failure mode.
Based on our analyses, the deeper rotational failure mode has
a slightly higher factor of safety �FS� �i.e., see Fig. 18�c�, wherein
the most critical LEM surface has FS= 1.12� than the translational
mode on the critical thin, sensitive stratum. Based on our inter
pretations of the data and geometries, the deeper rotational mode
has factors of safety that are approximately 29–34% higher, re

spectively, based on ﬁnite-element and limit equilibrium analyses
than the critical mode of lateral translation along the thin critical
stratum of sensitive organic clay �i.e., see Fig. 18�a�, wherein
the most critical LEM surface has FS= 0.83 at this same water
elevation�.
The deeper rotational failure mechanism has a relatively low
factor of safety �i.e., FS = 1.12�, and it can also approximately
serve to explain the ﬁrst toe exit scarp feature �Toe Scarp 1 of Fig.
4�b��. But this second �deeper, rotational� potential failure mode
cannot explain other critically important observed ﬁeld phenom
ena as shown in Fig. 4, and illustrated by the deformation modes
resulting from these two failure mechanisms as shown in Figs.
18�b and d�, including: �1� the very large lateral translation
��49 ft� of the intact inboard half of the levee embankment sec
tion �the deeper rotational mechanism provides for only very lim
ited lateral displacement of the levee crest section, and of the
crest fence�; �2� the lack of rotation of the displaced earthen em
bankment section with its horizontal crest, and nearly vertical
crest fence after displacement; and �3� the multiple exiting toe
scarps �including Scarps 2 and 3� that extend well over 100 ft to
the inboard side of the original location of the landside levee toe.
Although the deeper, rotational failure mechanism does not
explain the physical evidence at this breach site, it should be
noted that this deeper rotational failure would have likely oc
curred if the canal water elevation had risen to approximately +10
to +10.5 ft �MSL�, and if the thin stratum of weak and sensitive
organic clayey silt at shallow depth had not been present to pro
vide an even more critical failure mechanism. Accordingly, this
deeper rotational failure mechanism would also have resulted in
failure to achieve the targeted factor of safety of FS �1.3 for the
much higher targeted design canal water level elevation �a tar
geted design water elevation of +14.5 ft �MSL��.

Discussion of Lessons Learned from the Failure
There were several issues that together led to the failure and
breach on the 17th Street canal. No single lapse by itself was the
fatal one; but there were a number of individual lapses that could
by themselves have likely prevented the failure if they had been
recognized and corrected. Other issues and/or problems worked
together, in conjunction, to contribute to this failure.
As discussed in the companion paper by Rogers et al. �2008�,
the USACE had battled for authorization to construct storm gates
at the north ends of the three drainage canals to prevent storm
surges from entering these canals and threatening potential ﬂood
ing of the Orleans East Bank protected basin. Local interests,
focused in part on concerns with regard to pumping of rainfall out
through these canals, appeared to thwart the USACE efforts in
this regard. The Fifth U.S. District Court ruled against the
USACE plans for tidal gates at the mouths of the drainage canals
in December of 1977 on the basis that the USACE had failed to
consider other alternatives. Instead, the plan to raise ﬂoodwalls
atop the levees lining the edges of the drainage canals was even
tually adopted �Wooley and Shabman 2007�. Construction of the
proposed gates would have been a good engineering solution, and
would have prevented storm surge rise within the canal during
this event. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the USACE has
received permission and closed off the north ends of these three
drainage canals, and has installed additional banks of pumps at
the north ends of the three drainage canals to pump water over
these drainage canal closures and out into Lake Pontchartrain.
A second policy decision, made jointly by local agencies and
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Fig. 18. Stability analysis and schematic representation of the potential failure mechanisms at the 17th Street Canal breach section with storm
surge at Elev. +8.5 feet �MSL� and with fully developed crack at the outboard side of the sheetpile/ﬂoodwall: �a� LEM stability analysis of
shallow transitional failure; �b� actual observed failure mechanism �i.e., translational failure along the sensitive clay layer within the marsh
deposits�; �c� LEM stability analysis of deep rotational failure; and �d� schematic representation of the deep rotational failure mechanism through
the deeper soft gray clays

by Congress, was the decision not to purchase additional land
adjacent to the drainage canals as part of the effort to raise the
canal levees �and ﬂood walls� to provide protection for higher
storm surge levels in the wake of the disastrous ﬂooding of much
of New Orleans by Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Adjacent homes had
been built up closely against the canal levees because these lots
were subdivided in the 1910’s and 1920’s at a time where the land
surface was 6 – 8.5 ft higher than present, and more than 40 years
before they were actually developed. Levee boards judged that
the cost of purchasing additional right of way to permit widening
of the earthen levee embankments would have been excessive and
that popular public sentiment opposed such drastic action �Rogers
2008�. It was decided instead, to raise sheetpile-supported con
crete ﬂoodwalls at the crests of the levees, keeping the old earthen
levees �constructed between 1833 and 1878� within their existing
footprints �Wooley and Shabman 2007; ILIT 2006�. That was a
more challenging approach, because enlarged �and widened�
earthen levees would have been more effective in supporting the
ﬂoodwalls and the increased lateral water forces that would even
tually be exerted against these ﬂoodwalls.
Recognizing the difﬁculties associated with the raising of
these ﬂoodwalls on the crests of the existing, relatively narrow
earthen levees, the local New Orleans District of the USACE
performed a test of key components this type of ﬂoodwall design
in the nearby Atchafalaya River basin. That project, referred to as
the E99 test section, involved the construction of a sheetpile/
ﬂoodwall �I-wall� section inboard of an existing levee along the
Atchafalaya River atop foundation soils that were similar to those
present along portions of the 17th Street canal. A sheetpile cof
ferdam was constructed to allow progressively higher water levels
to laterally load the E99 sheetpile/ﬂoodwall section. The test sec
tion’s sheetpile wall was brought to a condition estimated to rep
resent an incipient failure. During this ﬁeld test, the sheetpile wall
appeared to rotate as an essentially rigid unit. This rotation should
have opened a gap between the sheetpiles and the adjacent com
pacted earth, but the E-99 test was stopped short of a full stability
failure, and there is no record of a gap being observed during
testing. Because the wall and the soil in front of the wall were
covered with a plastic membrane, which was in turn ﬁlled with
water, it would have been difﬁcult to observe a gap opening even
if it did. Several follow-on analytical studies were performed to
evaluate the E-99 test section �e.g., Jackson 1988; Oner et al.
1988; 1997a,b; Leavall et al. 1989�, but the possibility of a waterﬁlled gap forming on the canal-side of the sheetpile/ﬂoodwall was
not considered in the design analyses of these I-wall sections
�USACE 1990�. It appears that an opportunity to identify a po
tentially important failure mechanism was missed, due in part to
the membrane that was employed to ensure water-tightness during
the test.
The USACE generally requires a minimum FS of 1.3 for
evaluating potential lateral levee embankment instability for
transient loadings, such as a relatively short duration hurricaneinduced storm surge. The FS � 1.3 criterion has evolved histori
cally, and dates back to an earlier era when most levees protected
primarily rural, agricultural lands; not major urban areas with
populations of hundreds of thousands of people. Additionally, the
transient loading of hurricane-induced storm surges represents the
primary loading condition for which these levees were built.
Given the high stakes in terms of population at risk, it is our view
that this factor of safety provided too little margin for errors,
omissions, inherent geotechnical uncertainty, or for unusual geo
logical conditions that might go undiscovered at any point along

many miles of levee frontage by relatively sparse site investiga
tions �ILIT 2006�.
There were also a number of geotechnical lapses that contrib
uted to this failure. There appears to have been under-appreciation
of the importance of local geological nuances in the design pro
cess. Field investigations �e.g., drilling, sampling, and testing�
were often performed as separate operations, disjoint from the
subsequent analyses and design operations. Integration of geo
logical and geotechnical data, veriﬁcation of ﬁeld observations by
experienced engineers and geologists, and careful evaluation of
abnormalities are essential elements to designing a water protec
tion system that spans such difﬁcult and varied geology. For
example, during these forensic investigations, the critical thin
stratum at this site was only discovered after questioning why
there was such a high rate of nonretrieval of samples at the same
depth at the site. Of course, after a failure, it is easier to identify
such a layer, but a careful study of the local geology and re
evaluation of the sampling success at the site would have likely
identiﬁed the potential for weak thin layers of sensitive clays in
this environment �e.g., Leonards 1982�. Based on the observa
tions from the initial ﬁeld forensics, the ILIT ﬁeld sampling team
was looking for a potential unusually weak stratum at a depth of
approximately 5 – 10 ft beneath the inboard levee toe that might
have led to a translational lateral stability failure. The team was
aware of the potential for these types of “hurricane” strata, and
the likelihood that they would be covered by organic debris from
a �saltwater-induced� posthurricane die off. Based on the preKatrina borings and data, and the obvious gap in data at the depth
of this critical stratum caused suspicion.
This serves as an important pair of lessons for the geotechnical
profession: �1� it points up the continuing importance of geologi
cal engineering and engineering geology; and �2� it points up the
importance of fully integrating all phases of engineering design
�and maintenance�, including site investigation, laboratory testing,
engineering geology, geotechnical analysis, and engineering de
sign. Unfortunately, the pressures of modern practice appear to be
increasingly causing these functions to be performed separately,
and often by sub-teams and individuals who are not adequately
interactive with the overall process.
Additionally, the methods used during the original design stud
ies to analyze the critical potential failure mode of lateral
embankment instability were outdated. Despite the widespread
availability of more advanced methods, the local district had con
tinued to perform these analyses using the “method of planes,”
which is essentially a three-wedge force equilibrium method in
which a central block is sandwiched between an active wedge and
a passive wedge �USACE 1990�. The method requires a horizon
tal sliding plane beneath the base of the central block. Side forces
at the vertical boundaries between the three blocks include no
shear tractions, resulting in horizontal side forces on these interblock boundaries, so the method provides a moderately conserva
tive assessment of lateral stability for situations to which it can be
suitably applied �IPET 2007�. Armed with relatively sparse site
investigation data, the common local practice for Federal project
levees in the region was to assume laterally horizontal stratigra
phy; permitting the use of the simplistic method of planes. This
was further exacerbated by the assumption that the local stratig
raphy of the marsh types of deposits tended to be relatively hori
zontally layered.
The local stratigraphy, however, was not horizontally layered.
Drainage features, that subsequently inﬁlled with new accreted
sediments, led to local slopes at subsurface soil strata boundaries.
In addition, consolidation of relatively soft, compressible sedi

ments under the loads imposed by the constructed earthen levee
embankments also produced nonlevel soil strata boundaries. As
discussed in the companion papers �Seed et al. 2008a,b�, rela
tively subtle changes in the slopes of soil strata boundaries at a
number of the most important failure sites during Hurricane Kat
rina were the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory
performance of the levees at those sites. As discussed in the com
panion paper on regional and local geology by Rogers et al.
�2008�, localized nonlevel stratigraphy should have been antici
pated. More modern, ﬂexible, and accurate methods of limit equi
librium analysis were available that could have been used to
search for potentially more critical failure surfaces �IPET 2007�.
The processing of available data and the selection of soil shear
strength values for design are another set of geotechnical issues
that warrant consideration. Fig. 19 shows a summary of available
�pre-Katrina� shear strength data, and the shear strength versus
depth proﬁle �the solid line� that was eventually selected and used
during the original design studies along the levee frontage section
that included the 17th Street canal breach site. The datum used in
Fig. 19 is the archaic “cairo datum,” which is offset by approxi
mately +20 ft �MSL�. One potential problem is attributed to the
“averaging” of data across large longitudinal lateral distances
�i.e., along the levee� and lateral extrapolation away from the
crest of the levee as discussed in the following paragraphs.
A second issue here was the judgmental interpretation of the
available strength data. As shown in Fig. 19, the shear strength
proﬁle eventually used for the original design analyses is difﬁcult
to justify based on the available strength data as the strength
proﬁle selected clearly falls on the high side of a majority of the
data in the critical elevation range of between −5 and −30 ft
�MSL�. Fig. 19 has been annotated to show: �1� the depth range
within which the thin, critical organic silty clay stratum that be
came the eventual failure plane is located; and �2� the principal
depth range of interest for the second most critical potential fail
ure mode, i.e., the deeper rotational failure through the soft, gray
clays. As shown in this Fig. 19, there is a disturbing “gap” in
shear strength data at the depth of the upper, critical failure plane.
The earliest of the original site investigation borings resulted in a
number of “nonrecovered” samples in adjacent boreholes at this
depth, and the lack of data at this critical depth continued to
persist through the design process. Equally daunting is the clear
tendency of the shear strengths selected for design in the lower
depth range, representative of the critical depth for deeper rota
tional failure through the soft gray clays, to fall below the
strength proﬁle selected for design �which is indicated by the
heavy solid line in Fig. 19�, as was also noted in the IPET inves
tigation �IPET 2007�. This particular observation is more critical
considering that the strength proﬁle �derived primarily from
UUTX tests� was not corrected to account for the more realistic
simple shear mechanism that will likely dominate the response.
This apparent overestimation of strengths was then worsened
by extrapolating them laterally towards regions in which the ac
tual strengths would be even lower due to lesser overburden
stresses. The shear strengths shown as data points in Fig. 19 were
nearly all based on samples recovered from beneath the centers of
the earthen levee sections; locations which had the highest levels
of overburden stress due to the weights of the overlying embank
ments. These strengths were then extrapolated laterally, and were
used beneath the inboard �landside� toes of the levee embank
ments, and even beneath the bare ground to the inboard side of
the levee toes; regions with far lesser effective vertical overbur
den stresses. The use of shear strengths measured from samples
obtained from beneath the centers of the levee embankments

would, of course, be expected to systematically overestimate
shear strengths beneath and inboard of the levee toes, and it is the
regions beneath and inboard side levee toes that are most critical
for the types of lateral translational stability that eventually pro
duced the breach and failure at this site. The work of Ladd and
Foott �1974�, and Foott and Ladd �1977� in working with miner
alogically similar clays at the nearby Atchafalaya River levees
was pivotal in establishing the SHANSEP-type methods for engi
neering assessment of these types of strengths �and the systematic
effects of effective consolidation stress and OCR on these
strengths�, and it was unfortunate that these important principles
were not employed in the design analyses for this breached
section.

Conclusions
At the 17th Street canal breach site, a key lesson is the continuing
importance of the role of engineering geology, and the importance
of the local geology and subtle geological nuances. The presence
of the thin, highly sensitive “hurricane” layer of organic silty clay
that became the critical shear surface for the lateral translational
failure that eventually occured went undetected through the initial
design investigations and some postfailure investigations. The po
tential existence and causes of these types of strata �which are
produced by previous hurricanes� and the likelihood that they
would be overlain and obscured by leaves and twigs and other
organic detritus �from the same causative hurricane� are salient
features of this geologic region �Kolb and Van Lopik 1958�. With
poor sample recovery from conventional soil borings coupled
with CPTU proﬁling, there were multiple indications that such a
stratum might be present at this site. Yet it was missed. This
important failure may serve to help bring a renewed appreciation
for the continuing importance of geological engineering and the
potentially dangerous effects of thin layers of weak sensitive ma
terials �e.g., Leonards 1982�.
At this site, and at many of the other sites discussed in the
companion papers �including sites at which failures occurred and
sites where levees performed successfully�, another important les
son was the high degree to which the investigation was able to
match analytical ﬁndings with observed ﬁeld performance; even
for cases where the differences in geometry, stratigraphy, and
loads between non-failure and failure sites were relatively minor.
Both conventional limit equilibrium analyses, as well as more
advanced ﬁnite-element analyses, agreed closely with the ob
served ﬁeld performance if accurate material parameters were
used.
However, the analyses need to be a part of a suitably inte
grated study including: �1� ﬁeldwork; �2� laboratory testing; �3�
analysis and design; �4� construction; and �5� operation and main
tenance. It was the integration of the various elements of this
process that led to the positive results of this forensic study. And,
it may be argued that failure to fully integrate these various ac
tivities contributed to the initial failure. This case study thus
serves to emphasize the need to integrate fully all of these stages
or elements of the overall engineering process; both for design
studies and for forensic studies. This stands in some contrast to
current trends in practice, in which these are increasingly
routinely treated as disparate project elements, performed by dif
ferent personnel or teams, and often without optimal levels of
coordination and cross communication �and feedback� between
these efforts and teams.
Important lessons to be noted for forensic studies include the
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Fig. 19. Shear strength proﬁle used in original design analyses: 17th Street Canal breach section �adapted from USACE 1990�

need to consider all data and observations, and all potential failure
modes, and to test evolving hypotheses as thoroughly as possible
against all available ﬁeld observations. There were two potential
failure modes of nearly similar fragility at this site; and both
modes would appear to provide potentially feasible explanations
of the ﬁrst toe scarp observed �i.e., Toe Scarp 1 in Figs. 4�b� and
18�a��. The deeper, semirotational failure mode cannot, however,
suitably explain a number of other important ﬁeld observations,
including: �1� the large lateral displacement of the central portion
of the levee embankment section; �2� Toe Scarps 2 and 3 farther
to the inboard side of the laterally displaced intact levee section;
and �3� the lack of rotation of the relatively intact, displaced levee
embankment section. Only one potential failure mechanism, lat
eral translational failure along a shallow, weak and/or sensitive
soil layer can satisfactorily explain all of these features. In fact, it
was primarily the combined post-failure ﬁeld observations of ap
parent lack of rotation accompanying the large lateral translation
of the levee section that led the ILIT investigators to look for an
unusually weak, sensitive stratum occurring at relatively shallow
depth beneath the inboard-side levee toe.
There were also a number of decisions during the original
design process that contributed to this failure. These included
decisions: �1� to disallow the construction of storm gates at the
northern ends of the drainage canals; �2� not to purchase addi
tional land to provide sufﬁcient right of way as to permit widen
ing of the earthen levee embankments; and �3� the use of a low
required minimum factor of safety of only 1.3 for the transient
loading conditions represented by relatively short-duration
hurricane-induced surges in canal water elevations. It is judged
that this FS was too low for levee systems protecting urban popu
lations. It was too low for the principal loading condition for
which the levees were conceived �i.e., hurricane-induced storm
surges�, and it provided an insufﬁcient margin for any oversights,
uncertainty, or geological anomalies not adequately discovered or
characterized by the site investigations and design analyses.
A number of engineering problems also contributed to this
failure, including: �1� failure to notice the thin, sensitive stratum
of organic clayey silt that became the critical sliding surface for
this failure, despite evidence from multiple nonrecovered samples
that something unusual existed at that depth; �2� the continued use
of an outdated stability analysis procedure �i.e., the method of
planes� that was unable to deal adequately with nonhorizontal soil
layering; �3� assumption of level soil layering �stratigraphy�; �4�
extrapolation and averaging of soil shear strength data across ex
cessive lateral distances; �5� optimistic interpretation of some of
the available shear strength data and lack of correction for differ
ent shear mechanism �i.e., simple shear rather than triaxial condi
tions�; �6� failure to recognize and fully incorporate the effects of
effective overburden stress �and OCR� on soil shear strengths, so
that strengths evaluated beneath the full weight of the central
levee embankment were taken as being also representative of the
lower stress regions beneath the levee toes �and inboard of the
levee toes�; and �7� failure to include consideration of the likely
effects of the potential formation of a water-ﬁlled crack on the
outboard-side of the sheetpile curtain.
No single factor among all of these can be singled out as the
most important. Correction of any of a number of these factors,
including policy decisions and geologic/engineering factors and
judgments, might have prevented this failure. Other factors
served, in combination, to contribute jointly to this failure. It is
now incumbent upon the profession to learn the lessons offered
by the Katrina tragedy, and to ensure that these types of failures
are not repeated.
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